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Abstract: I comment on two of Ng’s suggestions. There is a lack of support for his suggestion
that some experiments on individual animals will be useful for future success, so they should
be permitted. I also question his recommendation that animal advocacy should focus on
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more effective strategy leads me to suggest a more pluralistic support of a variety of types of
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I want to respond to two of Ng’s (2016) suggestions on how to increase the influence of
animal welfare advocates: Allowing (some) experiments on other animals and prioritising
advocacy on farmed animals over advocacy on wild animals.
The first suggestion is Ng’s call for caution “in pressing for the curtailment of animal research
that can increase our scientific knowledge in the interests of human or animal welfare” (7).
There is a warning because in the long run animals, both human and non-human, are likely
to be harmed by the resulting lack of scientific progress. This seems true, but it disregards
the most fundamental interests of the individuals that are experimented upon. Humans and
other animals are comparable in that they have an interest in their lives and liberty; these
are valuable because the individual organism in question values them. Humans and other
animals are also sufficiently comparable in their capacity to communicate their likes and
dislikes as well as their agreement or disagreement about how they are treated. In the
human case, we rightly demand freely given, informed consent by the participant in
research. A similar respect for the individual should also be the guiding principle in our
dealings with other animals. If not, we need an argument as to why utilitarian considerations
trump individual rights in one case but not the other. Ng does not provide support for his
suggestion other than the unquestionable need for more progress in fields related to animal
welfare.
Further support is also required for Ng’s next suggestion that we should direct our resources
for advocacy to reduce the suffering of farmed animals first because we need more scientific
research on animal cognition and animal welfare as well as ecological risks when it comes to
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animals in the wild, and because human responsibility for the existence and suffering of
farmed animals is more likely to be accepted. We need this acceptance in order to prepare
the field for the future. Intervention in the wild for the sake of suffering animals has indeed
been used to ridicule the concern for the suffering of other animals. It is also reasonable to
assume that animal advocates have limited resources and that these should be invested
wisely and profitably, giving priority to what is more effective.
Nevertheless Ng’s suggestion is based on an assumption and ought to be better supported.
The suggestion that creating more awareness about and interest in reducing suffering in the
wild would support public sensibilities about the suffering of farmed animals seems just as
reasonable and likely. Considering how much effort individuals and communities have put
into being prepared and investing in assisting other animals in their vicinities, whether they
are birds or hedgehogs, stray dogs or cats, deer or bears, it seems premature to neglect any
type of interaction without solid data to back one type of advocacy over the other.
Relations between humans and other animals are very diverse. While our history of
domesticating animals gives us some additional reasons to work on behalf of farmed
animals, this need not lead to a prioritisation of one advocacy over the other. While many
communities, both urban and rural, have more and stronger relationships with farmed
animals, human-animal relationships in the wild are a valuable resource for gaining more
information on animal lives, interests, and the possibilities of effective interventions that
reduce suffering. The debate around what sort of advocacy to support should therefore take
into account the variety of human-animal relationships and be more pluralistic and creative.
Related to this point is another consideration: Not only the relationships between humans
and other animals but also the interests, moral sensibilities and dedication of animal
advocates show great variety. In the long run, it might well be more effective to support
pluralism in animal advocacy. This would not only be useful for generating new ideas,
approaches and moral concerns but it would also allow potential future advocates to find
areas better suited to their individual skills, thus making them more effective. It would also
enable us to make better-informed decisions in the future based on the data that diverse
advocacy traditions will supply.
Ng makes some excellent points: Acceptance and public opinion are fundamental concerns,
even if they are concerns for no other reason than our limited ability to act independently of
them. It is also true that in spite of advances in our knowledge about animal cognition and
methods of reducing suffering, the improvements in welfare are insufficient. While I do not
believe that our need for more knowledge justifies treating any individual animal as merely
an object of research, animal advocacy is required to develop and to support alternative
methods of research. Ng is also undoubtedly right in his emphasis on the need to prioritise
and use our resources as effectively as possible. While the methods he suggests are indeed
simple and commonsensical, I would urge more variety and pluralism in animal advocacy,
assigning priorities only when they are supported by reliable studies on efficiency and on the
dynamics of public opinion. The suffering in the wild is of such immense proportion that any
neglect today seems inexcusable; it is too important an issue to rest satisfied with our
unexamined, commonsense assumptions. The scale of the problem is reason enough not to
assign priorities a priori.
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